Updated: August 2022
Rayliant Asset Management and its subsidiaries (collectively “Rayliant” or the “Firm”) have a fiduciary duty to make investment decisions that are in our clients’ best interests by maximizing the value of their shares.
This Proxy Voting and Governance Policy (“Proxy Voting and Governance Policy” or “Policy”), outlines our principles for proxy voting and includes a wide range of issues that often appear on proxies globally.
We have a Proxy Voting Committee (“Proxy Voting Committee” or “Committee”), which provides oversight and includes senior investment professionals from Portfolio Management, Research, Compliance, and Investment Operations personnel. It is the responsibility of the Committee to review issues not covered by these guidelines, and to review the Policy at least on an annual basis. Members of the committee are listed in Appendix A.
We believe a company’s environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) practices may have a significant effect on the value of the company, and we take these factors into consideration when voting. We sometimes manage accounts where proxy voting is directed by clients or newly acquired subsidiary companies. In these cases, voting decisions may deviate from this Policy.
This policy shall apply to Rayliant Asset Management Limited and Rayliant Investment Research.
Our proxy voting guidelines are both principles-based and rules-based. We generally vote proposals in accordance with these guidelines but, consistent with our “principles-based” approach to proxy voting, we may deviate from the guidelines if warranted by the specific facts and circumstances of the situation (i.e., if, under the circumstances, we believe that deviating from our stated policy is necessary to help maximize long-term shareholder value).
In addition, these guidelines are not intended to address all issues that may appear on all proxy ballots. We will evaluate on a case-by-case basis any proposal not specifically addressed by these guidelines, whether submitted by management or shareholders, always keeping in mind our fiduciary duty to make voting decisions that, by maximizing long-term shareholder value, are in our clients’ best interests.
Board diversity is increasingly an important topic. We believe a diversity of ethnicity, gender and experience is an important consideration. We expect boards to be comprised of a diverse selection of individuals who bring their personal and professional experiences. Hence, we generally will support proposals.
Companies may propose various provisions with respect to the structure of the board of directors, including changing the way board vacancies are filled, directors are nominated and the number of directors. Such proposals may require amending the charter or by-laws. We generally will oppose proposals without seeking shareholder approval and/or restricting or diminishing shareholder rights.
A classified board typically is divided into three separate classes. Each class holds office for a term of two or three years. Only a portion of the board can be elected or replaced each year. Because this type of proposal has fundamental antitakeover implications, we generally will oppose the adoption of classified boards unless there is a justifiable financial reason, or an adequate sunset provision exists. However, where a classified board already exists, we will not oppose directors who sit on such boards for that reason. We also will vote against directors that fail to implement shareholder approved proposals to declassify boards that we previously supported.
Some companies argue that increased indemnification and decreased liability for directors are important to ensure the continued availability of competent directors. However, others argue that the risk of such personal liability minimizes the propensity for corruption and recklessness.
We generally will support proposals adopting indemnification for directors with respect to acts conducted in the normal course of business. We will also support proposals that expand coverage for directors and officers where, despite an unsuccessful legal defense, we believe the director or officer acted in good faith and in the best interests of the company.
However, we will oppose proposals to indemnify auditors.
Proposals like these are often suggested by shareholders of companies with long-tenured CEOs and/or high employee turnover rates. Even though some markets might not require the disclosure of a CEO succession plan, we do think it is good business practice and will support these proposals.
The election of directors is an important vote. We expect directors to represent shareholder interests at the company and maximize shareholder value. We generally will vote in favor of the management-proposed slate of directors while considering several factors, including the market best practice. We believe companies should have a majority of independent directors and independent key committees.
• We believe that directors have a duty to respond to shareholder actions that have received significant shareholder support. We will vote against directors (or withhold votes for directors if plurality voting applies) who fail to act on key issues.
• We will abstain or vote against (depending on a company’s history of disclosure in this regard) directors of issuers where there is insufficient information about the nominees disclosed in the proxy statement.
• We will vote against directors for unilateral bylaw amendments that diminish shareholder rights.
We generally will not oppose that company’s directors simply because the board does not include a majority of independent members. And as defined by the U.S. stock exchanges, we will only vote against insiders or affiliates who sit on the audit committee, but not other key committees.
On occasion, directors are forced to compete for election against outside director nominees (contested elections). As we believe that strong management creates long-term shareholder value, we generally will vote in support of management of companies in which the funds are invested and place the persuasive burden on the nominee or the proposing shareholder to prove that they are better suited to serve on the board than management’s nominees. We may abstain or oppose proposals if we have concerns on the followings:
• Management’s track record and strategic plan for enhancing shareholder value;
• The qualifications of the nominees.
We support shareholder proposals that request a company to amend its by-laws to establish an independent lead director, if the position of chairman is non-independent. If a company has such an independent lead director in place, we will generally oppose a proposal to require an independent board chairman, barring any additional board leadership concerns.
These proposals seek to limit the term during which a director may serve on a board to a set number of years. When these proposals are not controversial or discriminatory, we generally will vote for the proposals.
Where boards find that age limits or term limits are the most efficient and objective mechanism for ensuring periodic board refreshment, we generally defer to the board’s determination in setting such limits.
Each company’s board of directors has a duty to always act in the best interest of the company’s shareholders. We believe that these interests are best served by having directors who bring objectivity to the company and are free from potential conflicts of interests. Accordingly, we will support proposals seeking a majority of independent directors on the board while taking into consideration local market regulations and corporate governance codes.
In order to ensure that those who evaluate management’s performance, recruit directors and set management’s compensation are free from conflicts of interests, we believe that the audit, nominating/governance, and compensation committees should be composed of a majority of independent directors while taking into consideration local market regulation, corporate governance codes, and controlled company status. And pursuant to the SEC rules, adopted pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as of October 31, 2004, each U.S. listed issuer must have a fully independent audit committee. Therefore, we generally will support proposals.
We believe that good corporate governance requires shareholders to have a meaningful voice in the affairs of the company. This objective is strengthened if directors are elected by a majority of votes cast at an annual meeting rather than by the plurality method commonly used. With plurality voting a director could be elected by a single affirmative vote even if the rest of the votes were withheld. We further believe that majority voting provisions will lead to greater director accountability. Therefore, we will support proposals.
Company by-laws sometimes define cause very narrowly, including only conditions of criminal indictment, final adverse adjudication that fiduciary duties were breached or incapacitation, while also providing shareholders with the right to remove directors only upon “cause”. We believe that the circumstances under which shareholders have the right to remove directors should not be limited to those traditionally defined by companies as “cause”. We also believe that shareholders should have the right to conduct a vote to remove directors who fail to perform in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties or representative of shareholders’ best interests. Hence, we generally will support proposals that would provide shareholders with the right to remove directors without cause.
We believe there can be benefits to an executive chairman and to having the positions of chairman and CEO combined as well as split. Hence, generally we will support a strong independent lead director. But, for companies with smaller market capitalizations, separate chairman and CEO positions may not be practical and we will defer to boards to designate the most appropriate leadership structure to ensure adequate balance and independence.
We encourage the use of reasonably designed equity compensation plan, and we believe the equity compensation plans should align the interest of management with incentives to increase long-term shareholder value. Hence, we generally will support the proposal.
However, we will oppose plans if they contain “evergreen” provisions, which allow for the unlimited increase of shares reserved without requiring further shareholder approval after a reasonable time period. We also generally will oppose plans that allow for repricing without shareholder approval. We will also oppose plans that provide for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even in situations where an actual change of control may not occur.
We view these bundled proposals as too restrictive and conclude that blanket restrictions on any and all such benefits, including the payment of life insurance premiums for senior executives, could put a company at a competitive disadvantage. Hence, we generally will oppose the proposal.
Like advisory votes on executive compensation, shareholders may request a non-binding advisory vote to approve compensation given to board members. We generally will support this item.
These proposals seek to force a company to amend executive compensation plans such that compensation awards tied to performance are deferred for shareholder specified and extended periods of time. As a result, awards may be adjusted downward if performance goals achieved during the vesting period are not sustained during the added deferral period. We believe that most companies have adequate vesting schedules and claw-backs in place. Under such circumstances, we will oppose these proposals.
The key purpose of remuneration is to attract, retain and reward key personnel who are fundamental to the long-term success of the company. The remuneration of executive directors should be determined by independent Remuneration Committees and fully disclosed to shareholders. Hence, we generally will support the proposals.
Retirement bonuses are customary in Japan and South Korea. Companies seek approval to give the board authority to grant retirement bonuses for directors and/or auditors and to leave the exact amount of bonuses to the board’s discretion. We will generally support proposals. However, when the details of the retirement bonus are inadequate or undisclosed, we will abstain or vote against.
The United States Securities and Exchange Commissions (“SEC”) has adopted rules requiring increased and/or enhanced compensation-related and corporate governance-related disclosure in proxy statements and Forms 10-K. Similar steps have been taken by regulators in foreign jurisdictions. We believe the rules enacted by the SEC and various foreign regulators generally ensure more complete and transparent disclosure. Therefore, we generally vote against shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director compensation.
Compensation plans (“Compensation Plans”) usually are a major corporate expense. Where disclosure relating to the details of Compensation Plans is inadequate or provided without sufficient information or time for us to consider our vote, we will abstain or vote against.
We will oppose plans that contain “evergreen” provisions, which allow for the unlimited increase of shares reserved without requiring further shareholder approval after a reasonable time period. We will also generally oppose plans that allow for repricing without shareholder approval. We will also oppose plans that provide for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even in situations where an actual change of control may not occur.
We believe that management and directors, within reason, should be given latitude in determining the mix and types of awards offered to executive officers. Hence, we generally will oppose shareholder proposals seeking to limit executive pay. Depending on our analysis of the specific circumstances, we are generally against requiring a company to adopt a policy prohibiting tax gross up payments to senior executives.
We generally will vote against shareholder proposals asking companies to require a company’s executives to hold stock for a specified period after acquiring that stock by exercising company-issued stock options (i.e., precluding “cashless” option exercises), unless we believe implementing a mandatory holding period is necessary to help resolve underlying problems at a company that have hurt, and may continue to hurt, shareholder value. We are generally in favor of reasonable stock ownership guidelines for executives.
These shareholder proposals require a company to adopt a policy that all or a portion of future stock options granted to executives be performance-based. Performance-based options usually take the form of indexed options (where the option sale price is linked to the company’s stock performance versus an industry index), premium priced options (where the strike price is significantly above the market price at the time of the grant) or performance vesting options (where options vest when the company’s stock price exceeds a specific target). We generally will support proposals unless:
• Pricing: We believe that options should be priced at a fair market value on the date they are granted. We generally oppose options priced at a discount.
• Re-pricing: An “out-of-the-money” (or underwater) option has an exercise price that is higher than the current price of the stock. We generally oppose the re-pricing of underwater options because it is not consistent with the policy of offering options as a form of long-term compensation.
We do not consider such perquisites to be problematic pay practices if they are properly disclosed. Therefore, we will oppose shareholder proposals asking to prohibit relocation benefits.
We generally will support shareholder proposals requiring the board to seek recovery of performance-based compensation awards to senior management and directors in the event of a fraud or other reasons that resulted in the detriment to shareholder value and/or company reputation due to gross ethical lapses.
Golden Parachutes assure key officers of a company lucrative compensation packages if the company is acquired and/or if the new owners terminate such officers. We recognize that offering generous compensation packages that are triggered by a change in control may help attract qualified officers. However, such compensation packages cannot be so excessive that they are unfair to shareholders or make the company unattractive to potential bidders, thereby serving as a constructive anti-takeover mechanism. Accordingly, we will support proposals to submit severance plans (including supplemental retirement plans), to a shareholder vote. And we generally will oppose proposals to ratify golden parachutes where the arrangement includes an excise tax gross-up provision and single trigger for cash incentives.
CASE-BY-CASE
We believe that in order to attract qualified employees, companies must be free to negotiate compensation packages without shareholder interference. However, shareholders must be given an opportunity to analyze a compensation plan’s final, material terms in order to ensure it is within acceptable limits. Accordingly, we evaluate proposals that require submitting severance plans and/or employment contracts for a shareholder vote prior to being negotiated by management on a case-by-case basis.
We generally will support shareholder proposals as we recognize that offering generous compensation packages that are triggered by the passing of senior executives may help attract qualified officers.
We will generally oppose proposals that ask the board to repeal the company’s exclusive forum bylaw. Such bylaws require certain legal action against the company to take place in the state of the company’s incorporation. The courts within the state of incorporation are considered best suited to interpret that state’s laws.
NOL Rights Plans are established to protect a company’s net operating loss carry forwards and tax credits, which can be used to offset future income. We believe this is a reasonable strategy for a company to employ. Accordingly, we will vote in favor of NOL Rights Plans.
We generally will support share repurchase proposals that are part of a well-articulated and well-conceived capital strategy. Furthermore, we would generally support the use of derivative instruments (e.g., put options and call options) as part of a share repurchase plan absent a compelling reason to the contrary. Also, absent a specific concern at the company, we will generally support a repurchase plan that could be continued during a takeover period.
Blank check preferred stock proposals authorize the issuance of certain preferred stock at some future point in time and allow the board to establish voting, dividend, conversion and other rights at the time of issuance. While blank check preferred stock can provide a corporation with the flexibility needed to meet changing financial conditions, it also may be used as the vehicle for implementing a “poison pill” defense or some other entrenchment device. We are concerned that, once this stock has been authorized, shareholders have no further power to determine how or when it will be allocated. Accordingly, we generally will oppose this type of proposal.
CASE-BY-CASE
Proposals requesting shareholder approval of corporate restructurings, merger proposals and spin-offs are determined on a case-by-case basis. In evaluating these proposals and determining our votes, we are singularly focused on meeting our goal of maximizing long-term shareholder value.
CASE-BY-CASE
Preemptive rights allow the shareholders of the company to buy newly issued shares before they are offered to the public in order to maintain their percentage ownership. We believe that, because preemptive rights are an important shareholder right, careful scrutiny must be given to management’s attempts to eliminate them. However, because preemptive rights can be prohibitively expensive to widely held companies, the benefit of such rights will be weighed against the economic effect of maintaining them.
The US generally accepted accounting principles require companies to expense stock options, as do the accounting rules in many other jurisdictions (including those jurisdictions that have adopted IFRS – international financial reporting standards). Hence, we will support shareholder proposals requiring this practice and disclosing information about it.
A fair price provision in the company’s charter or by laws is designed to ensure that each shareholder’s securities will be purchased at the same price if the corporation is acquired under a plan not agreed to by the board. In most instances, the provision requires that any tender offer made by a third party must be made to all shareholders at the same price. Hence, we generally will support it.
Generally, we will support proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issuance, and generally support proposals to increase the number of shares of preferred stock if they are not inadequate or undisclosed.
We are generally in favor of issuances of equity without preemptive rights unless there is concern that the issuance will be used in a manner that could hurt shareholder value (e.g., issuing the equity at a discount from the current market price or using the equity to help create a “poison pill” mechanism).
The one share, one vote principle – stating that voting power should be proportional to an investor’s economic ownership – is generally preferred in order to hold the board accountable to shareholders. We will vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure. We will vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super voting shares.
We will support proposals that require the ownership level needed to call a special meeting to be based on the net long position of a shareholder or shareholder group. This standard ensures that a significant economic interest accompanies the voting power.
These guidelines are designed to protect shareholders’ value in the companies in which our funds invest. To the extent a company’s management is committed and incentivized to maximize shareholder value, we generally will vote in favor of proposals. We may vote against where a proposal is overly dilutive to shareholders value or other interests.
If a shareholder proposes that a company move to a jurisdiction where majority voting (among other shareholder-friendly conditions) is permitted, we will generally oppose the move notwithstanding the fact that we favor majority voting for directors. Our rationale is that the legal costs, taxes, other expenses and other factors, such as business disruption, in almost all cases would be material and outweigh the benefit of majority voting. If, however, we should find that these costs are not material and/or do not outweigh the benefit of majority voting, we will vote in favor of this kind of proposal. We will evaluate similarly proposals that would require reincorporation in another state to accomplish other changes in corporate governance.
Stock splits are intended to increase the liquidity of a company’s common stock by lowering the price, thereby making the stock seem more attractive to small investors. We generally will vote in favor of stock split proposals.
Most shareholder rights plans (also known as “poison pills”) permit the shareholders of a target company involved in a hostile takeover to acquire shares of the target company, the acquiring company, or both, at a substantial discount once a “triggering event” occurs. A triggering event is usually a hostile tender offer or the acquisition by an outside party of a certain percentage of the target company’s stock. A shareholder rights plan is designed to discourage potential acquirers from acquiring shares to make a bid for the issuer. Hence, we will support shareholder proposals that seek to require the company to submit a shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote.
These programs allow stock options to be transferred to third parties in exchange for cash or stock. In effect, management becomes insulated from the downside risk of holding a stock option, while the ordinary shareholder remains exposed to downside risk. This insulation may unacceptably remove management’s exposure to downside risk, which significantly misaligns management and shareholder interests. Accordingly, we generally will vote against these.
We believe that the company is in the best position to choose its accounting firm, and we generally will support the management’s recommendation. However, we generally will vote against the auditor if we find a conflict of interests. In addition, we generally will vote against authorizing the audit committee to set the remuneration of such auditors. We will also vote against or abstain due to a lack of disclosure of the name of the auditor while considering local market practice.
In some markets, companies are required to submit their financial statements for shareholder approval. This is generally a routine item and, as such, we will vote for the approval of financial statements. We will vote against it if the information is not available in advance of the meeting.
Some markets (e.g., Japan) require the annual election of internal statutory auditors. Internal statutory auditors have several duties, including supervising management, ensuring compliance with the articles of association and reporting to a company’s board on certain financial issues. In most cases, the election of internal statutory auditors is a routine item, and we will support the management’s nominee.
We believe that a company serves its shareholders’ interests by avoiding potential conflicts of interest that might interfere with an auditor’s independent judgment. SEC rules adopted as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 attempted to address these concerns by prohibiting certain services by a company’s independent auditors and requiring additional disclosure of other services. Hence, we will vote for proposals requesting the company to separate auditors and consultants.
We recognize the importance of the right of shareholders to remove poorly performing directors, respond to takeover offers and take other actions without having to wait for the next annual meeting. We also believe that encouraging active share ownership among shareholders generally is beneficial to shareholders and helps maximize shareholder value. Accordingly, we will generally support a proposal to call a special meeting.
We believe that a majority vote standard is in the best long-term interest of shareholders. It ensures director accountability via the requirement to be elected by more than half of the votes cast. As such, we will generally oppose proposals requesting the adoption of cumulative voting, which may disproportionately aggregate votes on certain issues or director candidates.
As explained above, we will generally oppose proposals requesting the adoption of cumulative voting.
These proposals seek to require a company to disclose votes sooner than is required by the local market. In the US, the SEC requires disclosure in the first periodic report filed after the company’s annual meeting which we believe is reasonable. We generally do not support this request.
Companies contend that limitations on shareholders’ rights to call special meetings are needed to prevent minority shareholders from taking control of the company’s agenda. However, such limits also have anti-takeover implications because they prevent a shareholder or a group of shareholders who have acquired a significant stake in the company from forcing management to address urgent issues, such as the potential sale of the company. Because most states prohibit shareholders from abusing this right, we see no justifiable reason for management to eliminate this fundamental shareholder right. Accordingly, we generally will vote against such proposals. In addition, if the board of directors, without shareholder consent, raises the ownership threshold a shareholder must reach before the shareholder can call a special meeting, we will vote against those directors.
Action by written consent enables a large shareholder or group of shareholders to initiate votes on corporate matters prior to the annual meeting. We believe this is a fundamental shareholder right and, accordingly, will support shareholder proposals seeking to restore this right.
These proposals allow “qualified shareholders” to nominate directors. We generally will vote in favor of management and shareholder proposal.
We will vote against proposals that use requirements including implementation restrictions and against individual board members, or entire boards, who exclude from their ballot properly submitted shareholder proxy access proposals or compete against shareholder proxy access proposals with stricter management proposals on the same ballot.
A reduced notice period speeds up obtaining shareholder approval of additional financing needs and other important matters. Accordingly, we generally will support these proposals.
We believe that proper corporate governance requires that proposals receiving support from a majority of shareholders be considered and implemented by the company. Accordingly, we will support establishing an engagement process between shareholders and management to ensure proponents of majority-supported proposals have an established means of communicating with management.
A supermajority vote requirement is a charter or by-law requirement that, when implemented, raises the percentage (higher than 50%, generally between 60~90%) of shareholder votes needed to approve certain proposals, such as mergers, changes of control, or proposals to amend or repeal a portion of the Articles of Incorporation. We generally will oppose these proposals and support shareholder proposals that seek to reinstate the simple majority vote requirement.
These proposals may include reporting requests or policy adoption on items such as pig gestation crates and animal welfare in the supply chain. We generally will support shareholder proposals if proposed information has no negative impacts on the benefit to shareholders.
Climate change increasingly receives investor attention as a potentially critical and material risk to the sustainability of a wide range of business-specific activities. These proposals may include emissions standards or reduction targets, quantitative goals, and impact assessments. We generally will support these proposals if the proposed information has no negative impacts on the benefit to shareholders.
Proposals relating to charitable contributions may be sponsored by either management or shareholders. Management proposals may ask to approve the amount for charitable contributions. We generally will support shareholder proposals if proposed information has no negative impacts on the benefit to shareholders.
These proposals can include reporting and policy adoption requests in a wide variety of areas, including, but not limited to, (nuclear) waste, deforestation, packaging and recycling, renewable energy, toxic material, palm oil and water. We generally will support proposals if the proposed information has no negative impacts on the benefit to shareholders.
These proposals may include reporting requests on pesticides monitoring/use and Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) as well as GMO labeling. We generally will support shareholder proposals.
These proposals may include reports on pharmaceutical pricing, antibiotic use in the meat supply, and tobacco products. We generally will support shareholder proposals.
These proposals may include reporting requests on human rights risk assessment, humanitarian engagement and mediation policies, working conditions, adopting policies on supply chain worker fees and expanding existing policies in these areas. We recognize that many companies have complex supply chains which have led to increased awareness of supply chain issues as an investment risk. We generally will support shareholder proposals.
We recognize that Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors can affect investment performance, expose potential investment risks and provide an indication of management excellence and leadership. We generally will support proposals.
We generally will vote in favor of proposals requesting increased disclosure of political contributions and lobbying expenses, including those paid to trade organizations and political action committees, whether at the federal, state, or local level. These proposals may increase transparency. Accordingly, we generally will support proposals.
In certain jurisdictions, these proposals allow management to act on issues that shareholders may raise at the annual meeting. Because it is impossible to know what issues may be raised, we will vote against these proposals.
These shareholder proposals would require companies to reimburse the expenses of shareholders who submit proposals that receive a majority of votes cast or the cost of proxy contest expenses. We generally will vote against these proposals.
We generally will support shareholder proposals calling for reports.
We generally will support shareholder proposals and support proposals requiring a company to amend its Equal Employment Opportunity policies to prohibit workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender ID.
We generally will support proposals requiring gender pay metrics.
We always must act in our clients’ best interests and attempt to avoid any perceived or actual conflicts of interest.
We take the responsibility to vote share in our clients’ best interests by maximizing the value of their shares. Votes generally are cast in accordance with this policy.
Rayliant is driven by two fundamental values: 1) putting the long-term interests of our customers and fund shareholders first; and 2) investing in companies that share our approach to creating value over the long term. With these fundamental principles as guideposts, the funds are managed to provide the greatest possible return to shareholders consistent with governing laws and the investment guidelines and objectives of each fund. We believe that there is a strong correlation between sound corporate governance and enhancing shareholder value. We, through the implementation of these guidelines, put this belief into action through consistent engagement with portfolio companies on matters contained in these guidelines, and, ultimately, through the exercise of voting rights by the funds.
ProxyEdge (www.proxyedge.com) is a proxy voting platform provided by our custodian bank. Investment Operations should follow the Proxy Voting and Governance Policy to update our decisions into ProxyEdge. And on a monthly basis, a voting summary report should be run and sent to the Legal/Compliance Officer for review.
Our voting records should be kept electronically for at least 7 years unless there’s a special requirement from regulators and customers. The main contact for all issues related to ProxyEdge is ICS.APAC@broadridge.com.
In the case of an issue arising and not covered by the guidelines outlined in this Policy, Investment Operations should escalate and propose the decision by sending the Proxy Voting Form (Appendix B) to the Committee. The Committee should review the form and provide the comments.
Proxy voting in certain countries requires “share blocking.” Shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (usually one week) with a designated depositary. During this blocking period, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to the clients’ custodian banks. In cases where we want to retain the ability to trade shares, we will abstain from voting for those shares.
We seek to vote all proxies for securities which we have proxy voting authority. However, in some markets administrative issues beyond our control may sometimes prevent us from voting for such proxies. For example, we may receive meeting notices after the cut-off date for voting or without enough time to fully consider the proxy. Similarly, proxy materials for some issuers may not contain disclosure sufficient to arrive at a voting decision, in which cases we will abstain from voting.
We will not be able to vote for securities that are on loan under these types of arrangements. However, under rare circumstances, for voting issues that may have a significant impact on the investment, we will request to recall securities that are on loan if we determine that the benefit of voting outweighs the costs and lost revenue to the fund.
It is the responsibility of the Proxy Voting Committee to approve the Proxy Voting and Governance Policy and review it at least on an annual basis.
In case of an issue not covered by the guidelines outlined in the Policy, Client Services or the Investment Operations should escalate it by sending the completed Proxy Voting Form (Appendix B) to the Committee. The Committee should review the form and provide sign-off or comments.
The Committee include:
• Mark Schlarbaum – Trading / Portfolio Management
• Phillip Wool – Investment Solutions
• Vivek Viswanathan – Research
• Dara Diederman –Compliance
• Matthew Bowers – Legal
• Vicky Wan – Investment Operations
To: Proxy Voting Committee
Name of Security : ___________________
Date of Shareholder Meeting: ___________________
1. Short Descriptions of the Proxy Voting (client, mutual fund distributor, etc.):
2. Proposed Voting Decision:
□ for
□ against
□ abstain
Is there an evidence that proposed voting decision is against our view of maximizing long-term shareholder value? ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….Yes/or No
Committee sign-off: Date: I hereby confirm that the proxy voting decision referenced on this form is reasonable.
Compliance sign-off: Date:
* Compliance sign-off is required only if the proposed voting decision is against our view of shareholder value.
* Email sign-off is acceptable.
Rayliant Investment Research (“RIR” or “we”) is appointed by our clients as an investment manager with a fiduciary responsibility to help them achieve their investment objectives over the long term. We have long recognized that environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) issues can impact the performance of investment portfolios. Accordingly, we have sought to integrate ESG factors into our investment process to the extent that the integration of such factors is consistent with our fiduciary duty to help our clients achieve their investment objectives and protect their economic interests.
Approach to ESG
Our experience in ESG applications has mostly been in integrating specific ESG principles into the design of an investment strategy. Our engagements generally include incorporating ESG elements selected by our partners who have specific ESG directives. This work is done by our research team in close collaboration with our clients. We first determine our clients’ ESG objectives and then configure our multi-factor quantamental approach to provide the highest possible risk-adjusted returns while fulfilling their stated ESG portfolio purpose.
Often our clients provide negative and/or positive stock screens to the targeted investment universes. In addition, desired ESG factors could be incorporated into our investment process at the signal generation or portfolio construction levels. Our goal is to provide client solutions that deliver the highest possible risk-adjusted returns whilst fulfilling clients’ ESG obligations.
One area of responsible investment that is a mainstay of our investment strategies is our attention to governance factors that represent accounting and investment conservatism. For example, we look at accounting conservatism which seeks to uncover firms that engage in accounting manipulation and fraud. Another factor we incorporate into our investment process is investment conservatism. This assessment leads to removing or underweighting firms whose management isare engaging in unproductive empire building at the expense of the best long-term growth opportunities of the company.
In recent years, we have gained greater clarity on how the PRI initiative, and We acknowledge these developments and are working towards becoming a PRI signatory.
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